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* AMENDED BLD-117      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1368 
___________ 
 
KEITH COLLIER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ADAMS; CAPTAIN BLUDWORTH 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 1-09-cv-02232) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 20, 2015 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Keith Collier, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court granting summary judgment to the remaining Defendants in this action 
brought by Collier pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).   For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 In 2008, Collier was moved to the Special Housing Unit at USP Allenwood as a 
result of a gambling investigation.  When his belongings were packed for the move, 
officers found homemade intoxicants and disciplinary proceedings ensued.  In protest, 
Collier began a hunger strike on July 4, 2008.  He alleged that Defendant Bludworth 
threatened to shut off the water to his cell if he maintained the hunger strike and that 
Defendant Adams shut off the water on July 9, 2008.  Running water was restored to his 
cell on July 12, 2008.  Collier ended his hunger strike on July 16, 2008. 
 While he was on the hunger strike, Collier was seen daily by prison medical staff,1 
who monitored his health and counseled him about the risks of not eating and drinking.  
Although water to his cell was turned off for 77 hours at the beginning of the strike, water 
was available to Collier in the medical areas, and milk was available at breakfast each 
day.  Collier, however, did not ask medical staff (or any other staff) for a drink because 
he felt he should not have had to ask.  He did not accept milk at breakfast because he felt 
it was like food.  Collier became dehydrated and was given intravenous fluids on two 
days prior to the end of his hunger strike. 
 Collier subsequently filed a Bivens complaint that included allegations that he had 
been injured by the deprivation of water to his cell.  The District Court dismissed the 
                                              
1 It appears that there was one day during the hunger strike that Collier was not seen 
by medical staff:  July 13, 2008, after running water was restored to his cell.   
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majority of Collier’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, but permitted Collier’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding water deprivation to 
proceed.  Bludworth and Adams, the remaining defendants, then moved for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted.  On appeal, we vacated the grant of summary 
judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the record was not clear on 
whether the water deprivation amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  See 
Collier v. Martinez, 474 F. App’x 870, 874 (3d Cir. 2012).  We concluded that there was 
an unresolved factual dispute regarding whether Collier had access to alternative sources 
of drinking water during the 77 hours.  Id.  We further noted that the Eighth Amendment 
claim would fail if it were shown that Collier had “access to adequate hydration during 
the period in question, even in conjunction with meals he otherwise did not desire to eat . 
. . [because] he would not be able to show that the complained-of deprivation was 
‘sufficiently serious.’”  Id. at n.5. 
 On remand, the parties engaged in additional discovery and filed new motions for 
summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be 
granted in favor of the Defendants, concluding in part that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity because Collier had failed to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
The Magistrate Judge explained that the undisputed facts showed that Collier had access 
to fluids during the 77-hour period in which the water to his cell was shut off:  milk was 
available every morning and water was available in the medical areas where Collier was 
seen each day during the period.  Collier chose not to drink milk and did not ask medical 
staff, or any other staff, for water.  Moreover, he did not establish that he would have 
4 
 
been refused fluids if he asked for them.  Nor did Collier show that the Defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk because they were aware that inmates on 
hunger strike were treated on regular basis by medical staff to ensure their health and 
safety.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and ordered that 
judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, if no substantial question 
is presented, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  We 
review de novo the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants.  
See Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
Although “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor in determining whether a genuine factual question 
exists, summary judgment should not be denied unless there is sufficient evidence for a 
jury to reasonably find for the non[-]movant.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 
F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must 
decide whether (1) the facts shown by the plaintiff “make out a violation of a 
constitutional right,” and (2) “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  “If the 
plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law.”  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).  For substantially 
the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s report and the District Court’s 
memorandum opinion, we agree that Collier failed to make out an Eighth Amendment 
violation and that, as a result, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds. 
 To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, Collier had to show that he was 
deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities . . . [which] includes 
proving that the deprivation suffered was sufficiently serious, and that a prison official 
acted with deliberate indifference in subjecting him to that deprivation.”  Griffin v. 
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Although the water to Collier’s cell was shut off for 77 hours, the conditions 
did not amount to the complete or nearly complete lack of access to fluids that we 
previously were concerned about.  See Collier, 474 F. App’x at 874.  On the contrary, 
fluids were available daily, but Collier either refused them or failed to ask for them.  
Although he asserted before the District Court that an issue of material fact was in 
dispute and that summary judgment should not be granted to the Defendants, he failed to 
specify what fact was in dispute and cite supporting evidence.  This is insufficient under 
Rule 56, which requires a party who asserts that a fact is genuinely disputed to support 
that assertion by either citing specific material in the record, or showing that the material 
cited does not establish the absence of a genuine dispute.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).  
Therefore, the District Court appropriately rejected Collier’s unsupported assertion. 
 The District Court also reiterated that the following facts undisputed facts were 
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presented by the Defendants:   
Collier’s hunger strike began on July 4, 2008 and ended July 12, 
2008.2  His cell, except for toilet water [which was free of urine], was 
without water for 77 hours.  During those times, Collier had access to 
fluids such as milk each morning, and he never asked staff for water 
or fluids.  He was constantly monitored and evaluated by medical 
staff during the 77 hours at issue.  Collier was constantly counseled by 
medical staff regarding the need to be hydrated.  He was given 
intravenous fluids on two occasions. 
  
Mem. Op. at 4, ECF No. 143.  Under these facts, we agree with the District Court that 
Collier failed to show that the deprivation of running water in his cell for 77 hours was 
“sufficiently serious.”  Cf. Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (prisoner 
held in cell without clothes, mattress, and running water for four days, but who was 
provided milk which he did not like to drink, did not show that the conditions violated the 
Eighth Amendment).  Given that the Defendants also established that they were aware 
that prisoners on hunger strike were monitored daily by medical staff, as Collier was, we 
also agree that Collier failed to show that they acted with deliberate indifference when 
they shut off the water to his cell.3  Collier has failed to offer any arguments on appeal 
challenging the District Court’s decision.4  
                                              
2 It appears that the District Court confused the date the water was turned back on in 
Collier’s cell, July 12th, with the date he ended his hunger strike, July 16th.  See Report 
& Recommendation at 18, 21, ECF No. 133; Statement of Facts in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. 
for Summ. J. at ¶¶ 4, 119, ECF No. 112.  
 
3 We also note that the administration of intravenous fluids for dehydration occurred days 
after the water supply to Collier’s cell was restored, and Collier did not aver that he 
suffered any long-term, lasting physical effects from his hunger strike. 
 
4 The District Court also rejected Collier’s challenge to the earlier denials of his motions 
to appoint counsel and close discovery, which he raised in his objections to the 
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 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Defendants.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Magistrate Judge’s report.  The court determined that the challenges were untimely and 
that the Magistrate Judge had properly deemed the motion to close discovery to be 
withdrawn because Collier did not file a supporting brief.  Collier has raised no 
arguments on appeal regarding this aspect of the District Court’s decision.   
